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This paper aims at determining the optimal locations for the leader’s new facilities under
the condition that the number of the follower’s new facilities is unknown for the leader.
The leader and the follower have some facilities in advance. The ﬁrst competitor, the lea-
der, opens p new facilities in order to increase her own market share. On the other hand,
she knows that her competitor, the follower, will react to her action and locate his new
facilities as well. The number of the follower’s new facilities is unknown for the leader
but it is assumed that the leader knows the probability of opening different numbers of
the follower’s new facilities. The leader aims at maximizing her own market share after
the follower’s new facilities entry. The follower’s objective is also to maximize his own
market share. Since the number of the follower’s new facilities is unknown for leader,
‘‘Robust Optimization’’ is used for maximizing the leader’s market share and making the
obtained results ‘‘robust’’ in various scenarios in terms of different numbers of the
follower’s new facilities. The optimal locations for new facilities of both the leader and
the follower are chosen among pre-determined potential locations. It is assumed that
the demand is inelastic. The customers probabilistically meet their demands from all dif-
ferent facilities and the demand level which is met by each facility is computed by Huff
rule. The computational experiments have been applied to evaluate the efﬁciency of the
proposed model.
 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Many factors should be considered for locating new facilities. One of the most important factors is existing/not existing
competitors in the market that offer the same goods or services. When there is no competitor in the market, the facility
which is going to be located will have monopoly condition. The vast part of location theory is to model a location problem
with respect to the monopoly assumption. Practically, the aforementioned assumption and the respective models seldom
become true and applicable in reality because a company rarely acts as the only player in the market and competition among
different players seems to be more realistic. A review on this type of location problems can be seen in different papers [1,2].
‘‘A location model is said to be about competitive facilities when it explicitly incorporates the fact that other facilities are
already/will be present in the market and that the new facility/facilities will have to compete with them for its/their market
share’’ [2]. Researches on competitive facility location models are originated by Hotelling [3]. He considered the competitive
facility location problem under the conditions that customers are uniformly distributed on a line segment and each of com-
petitors can locate her/his own facility at any locations in this space. All customers use the closest facility in Hotelling model.. All rights reserved.
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facility. In fact, Huff formulated a model for capturing market share and considered the probability of customer patronizing
behavior towards a facility. The aforementioned probability is proportional to the quality of the facility and inversely pro-
portional to the squared distance between a facility and a customer.
Competitive facility location is categorized into three categories of (1) static competition, (2) competition with foresight
and (3) dynamic competition. In this paper, the second category, i.e. competition with foresight will be considered. Compet-
itive facility location models vary in the ingredients which form the model. For instance, the location space may be contin-
uous, network or discrete. Demand is usually supposed to be concentrated in a discrete set of points, called demand points
and it can be either inelastic or elastic depending on whether the goods or services are essential or inessential.
Competition with foresight has attracted the attention of many researchers who investigate the competitive location
models. According to the Stackleberg’s economic model in 1934, the aim of the leader–follower location problem is to ﬁnd
an optimal strategy for these two competitors who make decision sequentially. The leader–follower problem is called a Stac-
kleberg game. This type of problems was introduced by Hakimi [5] for the ﬁrst time. He used the expression ‘‘medianoid’’ for
the follower’s problem and ‘‘centroid’’ for the leader’s problem. In fact, a (rjXp)-medianoid problem is the one in which the
follower locates r new facilities in order to maximize his objective function while the leader did the same action before.
In other words, the leader is locating p facilities at a set of points Xp. In a (rjp)-centroid problem, the leader is following to
ﬁnd the optimal location of p new facilities and considering this fact that the follower will respond to the leader’s action with
locating r new facilities. Here, the maximization of leader’s objective function is equivalent to the minimum of follower’s
objective functions which are maximized for their own problems. In general, when the demand is inelastic, the leader’s prob-
lem will be a (rjp)-centroid problem. Hakimi has proved that the leader–follower problems in (rjXp)-medianoid and (1jp)-
centroid cases are NP-hard.
A few researches have been conducted about the leader’s problem. Eiselt and Laporte [1] have reviewed all the researches
that were undertaken about the leader–follower competitive location models till 1996. Various models in the network space
have been studied by Hakimi [6,7]. Hakimi [6] solved the leader–follower problems in a network space with the aid of six
scenarios which are the combination of elastic and inelastic demands and also three different rules of the customer behavior.
Benati and Laporte [8] used heuristic methods for solving (rjp)-centroid problems. The leader’s problem with deterministic
behavior of customers in continuous space is discussed in different papers [9,10]. Drezner [11] solved the leader–follower
problem for Hotelling model and Euclidean distance through geometry-based approach. Ghosh & Craig [9] have solved
the similar problem to Drezner’s one by making all variables discrete and also deﬁning a set of predetermined potential loca-
tions for the leader–follower problems. They used integer programming for modeling the respective problem and their solu-
tion is only limited to relatively small scale problems. Two heuristics are proposed for the leader–follower problems in the
continuous space and on the basis of Hotelling’s proximity rule and Euclidean distance for locating new facilities [10]. On the
basis of Huff rule [4], Drezner and Drezner [12] have proposed three heuristics about probabilistic behavior of customers in
the continuous space for solving the leader–follower problems. In a research which was done by Sáiz et al. [13], the leader–
follower problems for the single facility and on the basis of Huff rule are solved by branch and bound method. Redondo et al.
[14] solved this problem with four heuristics and in a condition that the qualities of the new facilities are also considered as
decision variables for the problem. Shiode et al. [15] have solved the leader–follower problems for the single facility in both
linear and planar markets but it is assumed that the demand is inelastic and the customer behavior is deterministic and
Hotelling-type. The distances in their study are considered as rectangular.
Alekseeva et al. [16] and Kononov et al. [17] have proposed a model for the leader–follower problems in a discrete space
considering the rule of closest facility to the customers and maximizing the leader’s and the follower’s proﬁt. Alekseeva et al.
[16] has solved the mentioned model by a hybrid memetic algorithm. For the respective model, Alekseeva et al. [16] used
function approximation for determining a set of upper and lower bounds. Alekseeva et al. [18] have developed his prior re-
search [16] with offering a better solution. Plastria & Vanhaverbeke [19] have offered a model for the leader–follower prob-
lems in a discrete space. In their model, the follower locates a new facility while the leader does the same action with respect
to her budget. In the aforementioned study, the customer behavior is considered deterministic and on the basis of the least
distance and also three different strategies for the leader have been investigated. On the basis of probabilistic behavior of the
customers and Huff rule, Gorji, Makui & Ramezanian [20] have solved the leader–follower model in a discrete space.
After reviewing the literature on this topic, this conclusion can be drawn that all previous papers have modeled the lea-
der’s problem with respect to the assumption of deﬁnite number of follower’s new facilities but this assumption is relatively
far from reality. The authors in this paper have eliminated the assumption of the deﬁnite number of the follower’s new facil-
ities and the leader’s problem has been solved in a condition that the leader does not know that after locating her new facil-
ities, how many facilities are going to be opened by the follower. Therefore, ‘‘Robust Optimization’’ is used here to remove
this problem.
Robust Optimization (RO) is a branch of optimization theory. This method is used for problems in which an optimal ro-
bust solution against the uncertainty or variability in parametric value of the problem is sought. For the ﬁrst time, Mulvey
et al. [21] have posed the concept of this method in operation research in 1995. They offered an approach for optimization of
objective function in a problem whose data are scenario-based. In this approach, they have used a penalty function in their
non-linear objective function which is the expected values of different scenarios. After Mulvey’s research, Ben-Tal and Nemi-
rovski have developed the RO theory for linear quadratic and conic problems [22–26]. In fact, these authors utilized the con-
tinuous region for modeling uncertain parameters. Mulvey’s RO approach is used in this paper.
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follower’s new facilities in a discrete space.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, the authors discuss the concept of RO proposed by Mulvey et al. and in
Section 3, the proposed model of this paper is explained. Section 4 presents the computational experiments with a procedure
for obtaining solutions. The authors provide the conclusion of their ﬁndings and future research in Section 5.
2. Robust Optimization
The optimization problems have two different components [21]: (1) a structural component, that is ﬁxed and free of any
noise in its input data, and (2) a control component, that is under the inﬂuence of noisy input data. To deﬁne the appropriate
model, two sets of variables are introduced: x 2 Rn1 denotes the vector of decision variables whose optimal value is not
dependant on the realization of the uncertain parameters. These are the ‘‘design’’ variables. Variables in this set cannot
be adjusted once a speciﬁc realization of the data is observed. y 2 Rn2, denotes the vector of ‘‘control’’ decision variables that
are subjected to adjustment once the uncertain parameters are observed. Their optimal value depends both on the realiza-
tion of uncertain parameters and on the optimal value of the design variables. The optimization model has the following
structureMin cTxþ dTy ð1Þ
s:t:
Ax ¼ b; ð2Þ
Bxþ Cy ¼ e; ð3Þ
x; yP 0 x 2 Rn1 ; y 2 Rn2 : ð4ÞEq. (2) denotes the structural constraints whose coefﬁcients are ﬁxed and free of noise. Eq. (3) denotes the control con-
straints. The coefﬁcients of this constraint set are subject to noise.
To deﬁne the RO problem, a set of scenarios X = {1,2,3, . . .,S} is introduced. With each scenario s 2X the set {ds,Bs,C,s,es}
of realization for the coefﬁcients of the control constraints, and the probability of the scenario Psð
PS
s¼1Ps ¼ 1Þ is associated.
The optimal solution of the mathematical programming (1)–(4) will be robust with respect to optimality if it remains near to
optimal for any realization of the scenario s 2X. It is then termed ‘‘solution robust’’. The solution is also robust with respect
to feasibility if it remains almost feasible for any realization of s 2X. It is then termed ‘‘model robust’’.
First a set {y1,y2, . . .,ys} of control variables for each scenario s 2X is introduced. Then a set {z1,z2, . . .,zs} of error vectors is
deﬁned that will measure the infeasibility allowed in the control constraints under scenario s 2X. Consider now the follow-
ing formulation of the Robust Optimization modelMin rðx; y1; . . . ; ysÞ þxqðz1; z2; . . . ; zsÞ ð5Þ
s:t:
Ax ¼ b; ð6Þ
Bsxþ Csys þ zs ¼ es 8s 2 X; ð7Þ
x; ys P 0 x 2 Rn1 ; ys 2 Rn2 8s 2 X: ð8ÞWith various scenarios the objective function (1) e = cTx + dTy becomes a random variable taking the value es ¼ cTxþ dTs ys,
with probability Ps. For the ﬁrst term in the objective function (5), expected value can be used i.e. r(x,y1, . . .,ys) =
P
s2XPses.
The second term in the objective function (5) is a feasibility penalty function. It is used to penalize violations of the control
constraints under some of the scenarios. The goal programmingweightx is used to derive a spectrum of answers that tradeoff
solution formodel robustness. In fact, the ﬁrst termmeasures optimality robustness, whereas the penalty term is ameasure of
model robustness. A constant (k) times the variance i.e. k
P
s2Xðes 
P
s02XPs0es0 Þ2 can be used for variance cost.
In this paper, the RO used in the leader’s problem is as follows:Min
X
s2X
Pses þ k
X
s2X
es 
X
s02X
Ps0es0
 !2
ð9Þ
s:t:
Ax ¼ b; ð10Þ
Bsxþ CsYs þ zs ¼ es 8s 2 X; ð11Þ
x; ys P 0 x 2 Rn1 ; ys 2 Rn2 8s 2 X: ð12Þ3. Proposed model
In this section, the proposed mathematical model is presented. There are two competitors in a two dimensional market.
They have established some facilities in advance. There arem facilities of which t facilities belong to the leader and the rest of
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and she knows that her competitor, follower, surely responds to her action by opening some new facilities but the number of
follower’s new facilities is unknown for her.
The demand is considered as the demand point and there are n demand points in the market. The existing facilities are
located in m of n demand points and the rest of n m points can be considered as potential locations for leader’s new facil-
ities. Since the follower cannot open his new facilities in the location of leader’s new facilities, the number of potential loca-
tions for the follower equals n m  p. The authors consider Huff rule for customer patronizing behavior. According to this
rule, the customers share probabilistically their demand to all facilities. The probability of attracting a customer by a given
facility increases by enhancement of the facility attractiveness. The amount of a given facility attractiveness has a direct rela-
tionship with quality of the facility and a reverse one with the squared distance between the facilities and the demand
points. It is also supposed that the quality levels of all facilities – new and existing facilities – are predetermined. The dis-
tances between facilities and demand points are considered as Euclidean distance.
In this model, the leader knows that after opening her p new facilities, the follower will surely respond to her action and
will open his own new facilities but the fact that the leader is not certain about is the number of follower’s new facilities that
he is going to open. It is assumed in this model that the maximum number of follower’s new facilities and also the proba-
bility of opening different number of follower’s new facilities are known for the leader. The leader’s problem has been mod-
eled by RO in an uncertain condition in which the number of her competitor’s new facilities is unknown. Each number of the
follower’s new facilities is here deﬁned as a scenario and RO is consequently applied. In fact it is assumed that the follower
may locate 1,2, . . .,r new facilities. Therefore r different scenarios are obtained. The follower’s objective in each scenario is to
maximize his own market share and the leader’s one is also to maximize her ownmarket share after the follower’s new facil-
ities entry.
The following notations are used for formulating the model:
m the number of existing facilities
p the number of leader’s new facilities
Rsc the number of follower’s new facilities in scenario sc
n the number of demand points
nLpot the number of potential locations for the leader n
L
pot ¼ nm
 
nFpot the number of potential locations for the follower n
F
pot ¼ nm p
 
i index of existing facility; i = 1,2, . . ., t leader’s existing facilities and i = t + 1, t + 2, . . .,m follower’s existing facilities
j index of demand points; j = 1,2, . . .,n
sc index of scenarios; sc = 1,2, . . ., r
k index of leader’s new facilities; k = 1,2, . . .,p
h index of follower’s new facilities in scenario sc; h = 1,2, . . . ,Rsc
sL index of potential locations for the leader; sL ¼ 1;2; . . . ;nLpot
sF index of potential locations for the follower; sF ¼ 1;2; . . . ;nFpot
Psc the probability of scenario sc occurrence
k the importance coefﬁcient of difference between the solution of each scenario with the solutions’ expected value of all
scenarios
zi the location of existing facility i; (zi1,zi2)
yj the location of demand point j; (yj1,yj2)
PLs the location of potential location sL for the leader; p
L
s1;p
L
s2
 
PFs the location of potential location sF for the follower; p
F
s1; p
F
s2
 
bj buying power of demand point j (the population or total wealth represented by demand point j)
xsckL the location of the leader’s new facility k in scenario sc; x
sc
kL1; x
sc
kL2
 
xschF the location of the follower’s new facility h in scenario sc; x
sc
hF1; x
sc
hF2
 
dij the distance between existing facility i demand point j
dscxkLj the distance between the leader’s new facility k demand point j in scenario sc
dscxhFj the distance between the follower’s new facility h demand point j in scenario sc
qij quality of existing facility i for demand point j
qLj quality of the leader’s new facilities for demand point j
qFj quality of the follower’s new facility i for demand point j
Aij the attractiveness level of existing facility i for demand point j
ALj the attractiveness level of leader’s new facility for demand point j
AFj the attractiveness level of follower’s new facility for demand point j
XPscs
Lk
a binary variable that is equal to 1 if leader opens her new facility k in potential location sL in scenario sc, 0 otherwise
XPscsFh a binary variable that is equal to 1 if follower opens his new facility h in potential location sF in scenario sc, 0 otherwise
MscL the leader’s market share in scenario sc
MscF the follower’s market share in scenario sc
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one with the squared distance between the customer and the facility. The attractiveness level of existing facility i for cus-
tomer j equals:Aij ¼ qij=ðeþ d2ijÞ ð13Þ
If the distance between the facility and the customer is zero, the denominator becomes also zero and consequently makes
the fraction undeﬁned. Therefore e is added to d2ij to avoid denominator becoming zero.
Similarly, the attractiveness levels of the leader’s and the follower’s new facilities for customer j in scenario sc are respec-
tively as follows:ALj ¼ qLj=ðeþ dscxkLj
2Þ ð14Þ
AFj ¼ qFj=ðeþ dscxhFj
2Þ ð15ÞEach competitor’s market share is calculated by summation of all customers buying power multiplying the probability of
customer patronizing which is carried out by the respective competitor’s facilities.
As mentioned before, at ﬁrst the leader opens p new facilities. In this case, F PxsckL
 
the follower’s problem in scenario sc)
with respect to his knowledge about xsckL (the locations of the leader’s new facilities which were opened in scenario sc) is as
follows:Max MscF ¼
Xn
j¼1
bj
Pm
i¼tþ1
qij
ðeþd2ijÞ
þPRsch¼1PnFpotsF¼1 qFjðeþdscxhFj 2ÞXPscsFhPm
i¼1
qij
ðeþd2ijÞ
þPpk¼1PnLpotsL¼1 qLjðeþdscxkLj 2ÞXpscsLk
PRsc
h¼1
PnFpot
sF¼1
qFj
ðeþdscxhFj
2Þ
XPscsFh
ð16Þ
s:t:
XnFpot
sF¼1
XPscsFh ¼ 1 h ¼ 1;2; . . . ;Rsc; ð17Þ
XRsc
h¼1
XPscsFh 6 1 sF ¼ 1;2; . . . ; nscpot; ð18Þ
XRsc
h¼1
XnFpot
sF¼1
XPscsFh ¼ Rsc; ð19Þ
XPscsFh 2 f0;1g: ð20Þ
Eq. (16) is the objective function that maximizes the follower’s market share. Constraint (17) ensures that each follower’s
new facility is opened in only one of the potential locations. Constraint (18) shows that only one new facility can be opened
in each potential location. The number of potential locations that are occupied by the new facilities will be exactly equals to
the number of the follower’s new facilities by constraint (19).
After solving the follower’s problem for all scenarios, the optimal locations of the follower’s new facilities are obtained in
each arbitrary location for the leader’s new facilities in each scenario. Supposing xschF x
sc
kL
 
as the optimal solution of FðPxsckLÞ
problem in scenario sc, the RO for the leader’s problem is as follows:Max
Xr
sc¼1
Psc MscL  k
Xr
sc¼1
Psc M
sc
L 
Xr
sc¼1
Psc MscL
 !2
ð21Þ
s:t:
XnLpot
sL¼1
XPscsLk ¼ 1 k ¼ 1;2; . . . ;p; ð22Þ
Xp
k¼1
XPscsLk 6 1 sL ¼ 1;2; . . . ;nLpot; ð23Þ
Xp
k¼1
XnLpot
sL¼1
XPscsLk ¼ p; ð24Þ
XPscsLk 2 f0;1g; ð25Þ
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Xn
j¼1
bj
Pt
i¼1
qij
ðeþd2ijÞ
þPpk¼1PnLpotsL¼1 qLjðeþdscxkLj2ÞXP
sc
SLkPm
i¼1
qij
ðeþd2ijÞ
þPpk¼1PsL¼1nLpot qLjðeþdscxkLj2ÞXPscSLk þ
PRsc
h¼1
PnFpot
sF¼1
qFj
ðeþdscxhF j
2Þ
XPscsFh
anddscxhFj
 ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðxschF1  yj1Þ2 þ ðxschF2  yj2Þ2
q
:The objective function (21) offers a robust solution for the leader’s problem. This objective function maximizes the expected
value of the leader’s market share for different scenarios and also minimizes the difference between the expected value and
the scenarios’ optimal solutions simultaneously. The robust optimal solution for the larger value of k is the solution in which
the difference between the market share for different scenarios and the expected value of these scenarios is more important.
The difference between the expected value and the optimal solutions of different scenarios for lower value of k does not have
a great importance and the point which makes the expected value maximized is considered as the optimal solution. There-
fore k appropriate determination has great impact on the solution validity. The constraints (22)–(24) can be explained as
(17)–(19).
4. Numerical example
This section provides computational experiments to evaluate the performance of the proposed model. For this purpose,
numerical examples and a procedure to achieve optimal results for the mentioned instance are completely described.
At the ﬁrst instance, there are 16 demand points and 5 existing facilities in a two dimensional market. Three of these facil-
ities belong to the leader and two of them are considered as follower’s facilities. The leader aims at opening two new facil-
ities and knows that the follower will open a/some facility/facilities after her action. In fact, she does not know the exact
number of follower’s new facilities but she knows that the follower may open one, two, three or four new facilities. Existing
facilities are located in some demand points and new facilities can be opened in demand points which have been not occu-
pied by existing facilities. Therefore, the number of potential locations for both leader’s and follower’s new facilities equal 11
and 9 respectively. Each demand point has a different buying power from the others. The buying power is randomly gener-
ated for different demand points in a range of 1–10. Quality values are also determined randomly in a range of 1–5 for new
and existing leader’s and follower’s facilities. is considered 1 in this example. The locations of demand points and the leader–
follower existing facilities are stated in the following and depicted in Fig. 1yj ¼ ð0;0Þ; ð1;0Þ; ð2;0Þ; ð3;0Þ; ð0;1Þ; ð1;1Þ; ð2;1Þ; ð3;1Þ; ð0;2Þ; ð1;2Þ; ð2;2Þ; ð3;2Þ; ð0;3Þ; ð1;3Þ; ð2;3Þ; ð3;3Þ
zi ¼ ð0;1Þ; ð1;3Þ; ð3;3Þ; ð1;0Þ; ð3;2Þ; i ¼ 1;2;3 for leader and i ¼ 4;5 for follower
The buying power of demand points are stated as follows and the quality values of different facilities for demand points are
listed in Table 1. The potential locations for leader are available in Table 2bj ¼ 6;9;8;5;10;8;6;6;4;9;3;8;9;6;3;3
The leader knows that after she opens her new facilities, the follower who is assumed a rational person will surely open his
own new facilities at the optimal locations. The follower’s problem is a mixed integer nonlinear programming problem and
can be solved with an optimization solver. The follower’s problem has been solved with each leader’s potential location for
all scenarios and consequently the follower’s both optimal locations and optimal objective function values are obtained.
Moreover leader’s objective function values are achieved correspondingly. Afterwards, the value of probability for each
scenario multiplies by leader’s objective function value in each scenario in order to obtain expected value of the leader’s
objective function in a special potential location. The penalty value of solution robustness is subtracted from the obtained
expected value according to the equation (21) and this operation is done for all potential locations of the leader and ﬁnally
the obtained maximum value is considered as the optimal robust solution for the leader’s problem.
For example if the leader locates her new facilities in the locations (0,0) and (2,2) and the follower problem is solved with
the aforementioned points for different scenarios, the maximum value of leader’s market share is 61.9 for the ﬁrst scenario
(the follower will open a new facility), 52.6 for the second scenario (the follower will open 2 new facilities), 47.2 for the third
scenario (the follower will open 3 new facilities) and 42.8 for the fourth scenario (the follower will open 4 new facilities). It is
assumed that the leader knows that the follower opens his new facilities with the probability of 50%, 30%, 15% and 5% for one,
two, three and four facilities, respectively. The expected value of the leader’s market share in these potential locations ((0,0)
and (2,2)) is 55.66. This is done for all leader’s potential locations available in Table 1.The market share’s expected value for
locations (0,0) and (3,0) is 54.41 and can be determined for other locations as well. If the leader aims at selecting the optimal
locations of her new facilities with respect to the expected value of her market share for different scenarios, the locations
(1,1) and (2,1) with the value of 58.22 are considered as the optimal location. For obtaining the robust solution, penalty
function is subtracted from the expected value of the market share (according to the Eq. (21)). If k is assumed to equal
Fig. 1. The location of demand points, leader’s and follower’s existing facilities.
Table 1
The quality values for different demand points.
Quality value Demand point
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Leader Existing 2 2 3 4 3 4 5 2 4 2 2 4 3 5 1 3
1 3 4 3 3 1 4 3 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 4
1 3 5 2 3 4 2 5 1 3 1 3 2 1 5 2
New 5 3 1 3 3 2 2 4 2 2 3 1 3 3 3 4
Follower Existing 1 2 3 3 4 3 4 2 5 4 5 2 2 2 2 4
4 5 3 4 2 4 2 4 2 5 4 3 2 2 2 2
New 3 2 4 1 4 2 4 3 2 2 5 4 2 4 2 4
Table 2
The leader’s potential locations.
pLs (0,0),
(2,0)
(0,0),
(3,0)
(0,0),
(1,1)
(0,0),
(2,1)
(0,0),
(3,1)
(0,0),
(0,2)
(0,0),
(1,2)
(0,0),
(2,2)
(0,0),
(0,3)
(0,0),
(2,3)
(2,0),
(3,0)
(2,0),
(1,1)
(2,0),
(2,1)
(2,0),
(3,1)
(2,0),
(0,2)
(2,0),
(1,2)
(2,0),
(2,2)
(2,0),
(0,3)
(2,0),
(2,3)
(3,0),
(1,1)
(3,0),
(2,1)
(3,0),
(3,1)
(3,0),
(0,2)
(3,0),
(1,2)
(3,0),
(2,2)
(3,0),
(0,3)
(3,0),
(2,3)
(1,1),
(2,1)
(1,1),
(3,1)
(1,1),
(0,2)
(1,1),
(1,2)
(1,1),
(2,2)
(1,1),
(0,3)
(1,1),
(2,3)
(2,1),
(3,1)
(2,1),
(0,2)
(2,1),
(1,2)
(2,1),
(2,2)
(2,1),
(0,3)
(2,1),
(2,3)
(3,1),
(0,2)
(3,1),
(1,2)
(3,1),
(2,2)
(3,1),
(0,3)
(3,1),
(2,3)
(0,2),
(1,2)
(0,2),
(2,2)
(0,2),
(0,3)
(0,2),
(2,3)
(1,2),
(2,2)
(1,2),
(0,3)
(1,2),
(2,3)
(2,2),
(0,3)
(2,2),
(2,3)
(0,3),
(2,3)
68 M.G. Ashtiani et al. / Applied Mathematical Modelling 37 (2013) 62–710.1, the robust solution for the leader’s problem is the locations (1,1) and (2,1) but if the k is assumed as 0.2 or more, the
optimal robust solution is the locations (1,1) and (1,2). The correct determination of k is so important and of course depends
on decision maker’s idea about the importance of market share difference for various scenarios. The robust optimal locations
with different values of k in two conditions for the probability of different scenario occurrence (one is the probability men-
tioned in the above example and the second is the identical probability for all scenarios) is depicted in the Table 3.
Table 3
The leader’s optimal robust solution for different values of k.
k
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
P1 = 0.25 (1,1) and
(1,2)
(1,1) and
(1,2)
(1,1) and
(1,2)
(1,1) and
(1,2)
(1,1) and
(1,2)
(1,1) and
(1,2)
(1,1) and
(1,2)
(1,1) and
(0,2)
(1,1) and
(0,2)
(1,1) and
(0,2)
P2 = 0.25
P3 = 0.25
P4 = 0.25
P1 = 0.5 (1,1) and
(2,1)
(1,1) and
(1,2)
(1,1) and
(1,2)
(1,1) and
(1,2)
(1,1) and
(1,2)
(1,1) and
(1,2)
(1,1) and
(1,2)
(1,1) and
(1,2)
(1,1) and
(1,2)
(1,1) and
(1,2)
P2 = 0.3
P3 = 0.15
P4 = 0.05
Fig. 2. The leader’s optimal robust locations for her two new facilities.
Table 4
The leader’s optimal locations and her maximum market share for all scenarios.
ðxkL1; xkL2Þ ML
Scenario 1 (2,0) and (2,1) 63.6
Scenario 2 (1,1) and (2,1) 55.6
Scenario 3 (1,1) and (2,1) 50.0
Scenario 4 (1,1) and (1,2) 45.7
M.G. Ashtiani et al. / Applied Mathematical Modelling 37 (2013) 62–71 69According to the Table 3, when k is in a range of 0.1–0.7 in conditions that the scenarios have identical probabilities, the
robust optimal solution will be (1,1) and (1,2) and for kP 0.8, it will change to (1,1) and (0,2) but this value of k is too large
and eclipses the magnitude of the market share. The optimal robust locations for k = 0.1 in unequal probabilities are (1, 1)
and (1,2). In fact, the more k is, the more attention is paid by the leader to the difference of her market share in different
scenarios and she aims at minimizing it. The robust optimal solution for these two probability conditions by considering
a rational value for k is (1,1) and (1,2). The leader’s robust optimal solution has been depicted in Fig. 2.
To compare the robust solution with each scenario solution separately, this example is solved by the method in [20] for
deﬁnite number of the follower’s new facilities (each scenario). At deterministic condition, the follower’s problem is solved
for all leaders’ potential locations and the optimal solution of the leader’s problem is the location/locations which the max-
imum value of the follower’s market share in the least value. For more information refer to [20]. Leader’s optimal locations
and her market share in those locations for each scenario are depicted in the second and third columns of Table 4.
Table 5
Comparison between different solutions.
(xkL1,xkL2) Expected value Penalty function Subtracting penalty function
from expected value
(1,1) and (1,2) 57.67 6.22 51.44
(1,1) and (2,1) 58.22 6.85 51.37
(2,1) and (2,0) 57.23 9.34 47.88
Table 6
Results for the different problem size with k = 0.5 and identical probabilities for different scenarios.
No. n m t p Rmax Objective value CPU time (min)
1 10 5 3 2 2 40.27 2.40
2 10 3 1 3 3 32.19 16.83
3 10 2 1 2 2 36.25 8.96
4 15 5 3 2 4 49.62 49.73
5 15 3 2 1 3 46.61 18.72
6 20 8 5 3 3 82.85 59.97
7 20 5 3 2 4 65.91 109.20
8 20 3 2 3 2 90.63 190.17
9 30 8 5 3 4 116.35 158.62
10 30 5 3 2 2 120.83 207.14
Rmax: the maximum number of follower’s new facilities.
70 M.G. Ashtiani et al. / Applied Mathematical Modelling 37 (2013) 62–71As it is observed, the optimal locations for leader’s new facilities are different in various scenarios. With respect to the
follower’s intention for opening different number of new facilities, the leader locates her two new facilities in different loca-
tions. On the other hand, the optimal locations which are obtained by robust solution in an uncertain condition for the num-
ber of follower’s new facilities is the same as his optimal locations in scenario 4 which has the least probability among the
other scenarios. This depicts that robust solution not only considers expected value but also notices the minimum differ-
ences among market share in various scenarios and this means that the solution is robust against uncertainty.
For comparing the solution obtained by Robust Optimization with other solutions and also stating the main reason of
choosing this solution as a robust optimal solution, two feasible solutions (they are here the optimal solutions of the ﬁrst
and second scenarios in Table 4) are typically selected. The expected value of market shares in all scenarios and penalty value
of objective function (for k = 0.2) and the difference between these two values are depicted in Table 5.
As it is observed, the robust solution has the least deviation in comparison with two other solutions but it does not have
the highest expected value of market share. However it is chosen as the robust solution because it has the highest value of
penalty function after subtracting from market share expected value. In fact although the robust solution may not have both
the least deviation against 54 other solution of Table 2 and the highest expected value of market share, it has certainly the
highest value of penalty function after subtracting from expected value of market share. It means that the robust solution is a
solution that makes a trade-off between expected value of market share and market share deviation and also consider both
simultaneously.
To show the efﬁciency of the model, ten problems with different sizes are solved and the objective function values and the
run times spent for solving the problems are recorded in Table 6. In these problems the number of demand points, number of
existing facilities, number of new facilities to be located by the leader and number of new facilities to be located by the fol-
lower are varied. The required parameters are extracted from the following uniform distributions:bj  Uð1;10Þ; qij  Uð1;5Þ; qLj  Uð1;5Þ; qLj  Uð1;5Þ:5. Conclusions
In this paper the leader–follower competitive facility location model has been formulated in a condition that the number
of follower’s new facilities is unknown for leader. Therefore the authors have deﬁned scenarios for different numbers of fol-
lower’s new facilities and obtained an optimal solution that maximizes the expected value of the leader’s market share for
different scenarios and also minimizes the difference between the expected value and the scenarios’ optimal solutions
simultaneously.
As a future research, we can consider elastic demand for our model and reformulate it. Also, it is desired to develop some
efﬁcient meta-heuristic algorithms to solve the suggested model for large-scale problems.
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